The article reframes Irish wartime neutrality. It posits that Ireland's policy towards Vichy France conformed to the prevailing legal interpretations in the field of diplomatic recognition. This was consistent with the practice of Ireland's longstanding recognition policy from the 1930s until the 1960s. An enigma, however, envelops Ireland's retention of the Irish Minister to the Republic of France, Seán Murphy, after the fall of Marshall Philippe Pétain in August 1944. Charles de Gaulle's Provisional Government demanded the replacement of all heads of missions who had served in France during the Vichy interlude. This violated the traditional practice of recognition law as understood by Ireland and other neutrals. But the neutrals, with the exception of Ireland, reluctantly complied with the demand. How did the Irish Department of External Affairs succeed in circumventing this? No evidence of an illusive "back channel", that some authors speculate ended the accreditation crisis, has been found. There is limited evidence that secondary factors, such as the proposed establishment of an Irish Red Cross Hospital in Normandy, played a direct or significant role in senior French decision makers' calculations to reverse their policy in the case of Murphy. This article offers a fresh explanation for France's extension of a dispensation to Ireland: on petition from the Irish government, René Massigli, the new French Ambassador in London, made two decisive interventions which altered the climate of opinion in Paris and enabled Seán Murphy to remain. "We had no quarrel with any group of Frenchmen and our one desire with regard to France was to see her whole people united under one Government… We did not want quarrels between Frenchmen in Ireland 
tudes de l'Irlande et des autres pays neutres en matière de relations diplomatiques. Les pays neutres, à l'exception de l'Irlande, furent quand même forcés de se soumettre à cette volonté. Comment le ministère des Affaires Extérieures irlandais a-t-il réussi à contourner cet écueil

• Introduction
Ireland holds an intriguing but ambiguous privilege: it was the only neutral state permitted to retain its diplomatic representative to France into the postliberation period by Charles de Gaulle's Provisional Government (Gouvernement provisoire de la République française or GPRF). His Irish counterpart was Eamon de Valera and parallels are sometimes drawn between the two, not least in their self-ascribed roles as national conservatives, statebuilders and as interpreters of the national will 2 . Eamon de Valera held the portfolio of Taoiseach, in addition to that of Minister for External Affairs, which granted authority to the Department of External Affairs domestically and internationally. The department was based in Iveagh House, Dublin, and during the period of August, September and October 1944 it struggled for the recognition of Seán Murphy as the Irish Minister to the Republic of France by the new French government. Murphy had served as the Irish Minister Plenipotentiary and Envoy Extraordinary to the Republic of France since 1938. Dublin viewed the GPRF's acquiescence to Murphy's continuation in post as an incontestable right and a validation of Ireland's entitlement to pursue neutrality.
Previous Irish diplomacy vis-à-vis Vichy was indistinguishable from that of the other European neutrals, in particular that of the traditional neutrals Switzerland
• 75 and Sweden which were viewed in Irish diplomatic circles as setting the benchmark for neutrality. The "Irish exception" has fascinated authors such as Dermot Keogh, Robert Patterson, Phyllis Gaffney, Christophe Gillissen and Joe Carroll, who have endeavoured to account for the consideration shown to Ireland • 79
The second portion of the article scrutinises Irish-French diplomacy after D-Day when the crisis relating to Murphy's reception by de Gaulle's forces gradually came to light. The primary attentions of this part are devoted to reconstructing the events that led to the Provisional Government's retreat from its demand to replace Murphy.
The methodology adopted by this article is a blend of a comparative framework and the empirical archival approach. It consists of a reading of international legal history and the recognition policies of other states, in combination with a close reading of primary sources ( ". There is greater continuity in Irish recognition policy under de Valera's direction before 1948 than is acknowledged in the pioneering work of Wylie or in empirical narratives of Irish foreign policy. In the case of Vichy France, Dublin observed the conventional interpretation of recognition that prevailed. It recognised the Republic of France and upheld diplomatic relations with the Vichy Government, but this did not imply approval of that state's system of government (authoritarian) or its policies (collaboration with the Nazis) even if such a powerful official as Joseph Walshe, the Secretary of External Affairs, was initially attracted by the religious, social and educational policies of Philippe Pétain
27
. Personal predilections were not considerations -international law demanded the maintenance of diplomatic relations. Conventional legal practice was upheld by the Irish state.
As can be detected, recognition is a complex concept in international law 28 . In recent times, the maintenance of full diplomatic relations has been portrayed popularly as a sign of approval of a government. But this is not a correct reading of traditional diplomatic practice and convention. It is a popular misconception that arose during the Cold War when on several occasions ideology overrode diplomatic convention and international law in the East-West conflict: the withdrawal of diplomats was employed as a device to signal disapproval of the policies 24 • 81 or actions of governments on the other side of the divide 29 . This was a diplomatic innovation and was legally contentious. The departure from convention was largely a product of the acute bipolar tensions.
The removal of diplomats as a sign of censure was not normally considered advisable before World War Two. It contravened the traditional interpretations. Full diplomatic relations was required once diplomats were exchanged between recognised de jure states; diplomatic relations were essential to maintain communications between states for the benefit of their citizens and the smooth functioning of international politics 30 . According to this perspective, governments and governance systems changed but the state persisted and it was the state, not the government, which was recognised. Individual governments were epiphenomena or transitory guardians of the state. The reciprocal exchange of diplomats and normal diplomatic relations were necessary to sustain unbroken exchanges and dialogue between two states when peace reigned between them. Diplomacy had a function to perform regardless of which government or what form of government ruled. Following the exchange of diplomats, bilateral diplomatic relations had to be maintained in the absence of hostilities, even if later governments were considered odious. Bearing this in mind, how did Irish diplomatic relations with Vichy compare to that of other states, both belligerent and neutral, after May 1940?
• Recognition of Vichy otherwise would signify political disapproval; this would contradict both neutrality and the traditional interpretation of international law.
Regardless, the Irish government prepared for the diplomatic repercussions of the fall of Vichy and the Gaullist ascendancy. At this point close attention must be devoted to the Irish thinking underlying the decision to recognise de Gaulle's diplomats as the agents of the effective government of France in August 1944. The transition commenced in mid-1943.
• Recognition of the CFLN/GPRF . This Allied delay hinted at misgivings, particularly in the US, about sanctifying the accession of their vexing ally, Charles de Gaulle. If the Irish estimated their early recognition of the GPRF would purchase enhanced Irish-French relations, they were swiftly disabused.
• "No such persons are accredited to the French Republic"
The GPRF refused to recognise diplomats who had represented neutral governments at Vichy as heads of mission. Walshe received the first hints of its intentions in June 1944, but he discounted the possibility -it questioned the basis of a state to maintain neutrality under international law Laforcade's efforts to represent Irish interests to his superiors in the Quai had conspicuously failed. In addition, Laforcade experienced pronounced difficulty in communicating with Paris during the period of August and September, which aggravated the situation. Iveagh House's imperative was to search for alternative lines of negotiation. Murphy was unreachable, but he was in Paris according to Reuters. Walshe urgently needed to instruct him to engage directly in negotiations with the Quai. It was imperative to brief Murphy to empower him to plead his case accurately with the Quai. In these exceptional circumstances, Walshe directed the Irish High Commissioner to London, John Dulanty, to approach René Massigli, the newly appointed French ambassador in London
62
. This turned out to be a masterstroke: Massigli became the key to overcoming the Quai's resistance. 
• The Massigli Connection
As it transpired Massigli was a distinguished Gaullist and his advice commanded attention in the Quai. A senior French professional diplomat with international connections before 1940, he was a "faithful" devotee of de Gaulle • 89 ting it to Murphy is unclear. Regardless, the Quai was in no doubt about Walshe's intentions to retaliate in kind. In his instructions to Murphy, Walshe informed his subordinate that Ireland was "still somewhat mystified by some aspects of our relations with the French Government". He directed Murphy to approach the Quai again to explain the position of Ireland, which he outlined in detail in his three page letter. Walshe informed Murphy that the GPRF's suggestion that he should be replaced "could only be regarded as a somewhat unfriendly gesture directed against the Government rather than the representative of the neutral country concerned". In the "disagreeable eventuality" that the Foreign Office persisted in its refusal to recognise Murphy as head of the Irish mission to France, Walshe commanded Murphy to apprise the Quai: "We shall feel obliged to our very great regret to withdraw our recognition from M. Matters were approaching a resolution. Bidault, lacking full knowledge of the Irish case, was willing to keep Murphy but new letters of accreditation were requested. As detected, the latter condition was unpalatable to Ireland, but Bidault conceded that Murphy was acceptable in principle, which was substantive progress. However, on 5 October Walshe received a telegram from Murphy providing a disheartening account of his failed effort to convince the Quai. As instructed, Murphy had met the Secretary General of the Foreign Office, Raymond Brugère. He reported: "I was very coldly received and rudely received by the Secretary General." Brugère had bristled at the repetition of the argument that for Ireland "the Government de facto was the Government de jure, and the moment the Pétain Government had disappeared", Ireland automatically entered into relations with the new government 71 . Brugère "became irritable at the mention of the word 'de facto'". Walshe's instructions to Murphy were: as a small country Ireland did not "play politics" with recognition matters and a solution had to be negotiated with France "to put things right". He admitted that the Quai's treatment of Murphy was probably "due to frayed temper and inevitable annoyance with Vichy". But Murphy was told to make contact with Paris again, "Another talk with Secretary General might put everything right". Walshe had not retreated from his elementary posi- Keogh, Patterson and Gillissen all argue that this intervention by de Gaulle reversed the Quai's attitude. De Gaulle's terse question and comment suggested care should be taken in France's relations with Ireland. Massigli's emphasis on relaying the bad reception Murphy had received and the objectionable implications transmitted regarding Irish neutrality had an effect. Perhaps de Gaulle, following his long struggle for the "soul of France" in Winston Churchill's words, appreciated that Irish neutrality and its diplomatic requirements were vital in Irish endeavours to fortify political and foreign policy independence, in the same way that the Free French had depended on appeals to legitimacy, legalism and the performative 
An Audience with de Gaulle
The matter was not completely resolved as Phyllis Gaffney has revealed after the Quai relented on its demands for new letter of credence to be granted. Murphy still had to visit the new Head of Government in line with diplomatic custom. However, if Murphy was granted an official audience this would publicise the "Irish exception". Iveagh House and the Quai negotiated a compromise. Murphy had been due to return home to Ireland for debriefing and long overdue leave. He had been trapped with his family in France by the war since 1940. Murphy's taking of extended leave provided the Quai with a solution. It would allow the thorny issue of neutrals' representation to recede from the public eye, and purchase time to engineer a low-key way to satisfy the need for an audience with de Gaulle ." De Gaulle's words suggest sentimental factors played a role in solving the Franco-Irish diplomatic crisis. De Gaulle understood that in de Valera's situation he would have adopted a similar neutrality policy during World War Two. De Gaulle, as a French nationalist and an exponent of the primacy of the nation-state in international politics, was sensitive to respecting other states' national interests and Ireland was a friend of France. He respected the Irish government's perspective.
• Conclusion
In sum, the resolution of the Seán Murphy enigma does not reside in an Alphand-Boland "back channel" or the possible "complementary" factors identi- fied by Gaffney. Complementary factors may have assisted, but there is no direct evidence that they did and they were not the primary actors or causes initiating the special consideration in any case. The primary considerations were mutual respect of national interests and their accommodation. Keogh was correct: a French diplomat who had served in the French Legation in Dublin in the early 1930s played a central part in resolving the case. But it was Roger Gaucheron rather than Hervé Alphand, and it was not an Irish "back channel". Secondly, Keogh and other authors are correct in underlining de Gaulle's role in the resolution of the accreditation crisis, but only to a degree. Georges Bidault's line had softened significantly. De Gaulle's intrusion in Quai matters made subsequent relaxation on the letters of credence easier. Principally, it was the experienced French diplomat, René Massigli, who played the role as the initiator in the granting of the Irish exception. Massigli and serendipity had avoided a major crisis in Franco-Irish relations.
